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The Development of an Unequal Social Safety
Net: A Case Study of the Employer-based
Health Insurance (Non) System
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School of Social Work
The U.S. social safety net exacerbates labor market inequali-
ties rather than ameliorating them. This paper traces this theme
within an important historical case study: the emergence of the
employer-based health insurance system. Employers became the
dominant and tax-preferred provider of health insurance in the
United States without any federal legislative action. Understand-
ing how this happened may inform current reform efforts. This
case study highlights two important factors. The first is path
dependency, discussed by Skocpol (1992) and Pierson (2000).
They argue that the ambiguous divisions of power and a plural-
istic governance framework favor incremental processes of social
policy formation in the United States. The second factor is the di-
visions within the American workforce (Esping-Andersen, 1990).
Divisions by race and sex have often led to disadvantaged work-
ers being left out or underserved by U.S. social welfare policy.
Key words: Social welfare history, health insurance, low-wage
work, U.S. Welfare State
Compared with those of other Western industrialized
nations, the U.S. social safety net is exceptional in numerous
ways. Federal, state, and local governments in the United
States spend far less on social welfare per capita than do peer
nations (Gilens, 1999; Rank, 2004). Social benefits are divided
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into a visible welfare state and a "hidden" welfare state, which
provides support primarily to the middle class through the tax
code (Howard, 1997), and social welfare programs are divided
into public and private benefits, relying heavily on firms to
provide for their workers (Hacker, 2002). All of these factors
result in the same exceptional outcome: the U.S. social safety
net exacerbates labor market inequalities rather than amelio-
rating them. Low-wage workers are far less likely to access
unemployment insurance than their high-wage counterparts
(General Accounting Office, 2000); they are less likely to have
health insurance (Collins, Schoen, Colasanto, & Downey, 2003);
and they are far less likely to have pension coverage (Mishel,
Bernstein, & Allegretto, 2005). Thus, inequalities in the labor
market are matched by inequities in the social safety net.
This article traces these themes within an important histor-
ical case study-the emergence of the employer-based health
insurance system in the United States during the 1940s. In one
decade, without any formal legislation, employers became the
dominant and tax-preferred provider of health insurance in the
United States. Understanding how this system took root offers
important insights for those who wish to reform it. The analy-
ses presented here find that two important factors were critical
in determining this social policy result. The first is path depen-
dency, discussed by Skocpol (1992) and Pierson (2000). They
argue that the ambiguous divisions of power between levels of
government within a pluralistic governance framework have
led to an incremental process of social policy formation in the
U.S. The second factor is the divisions within the American
workforce (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Divisions by race, class,
and sex have meant that those at the bottom of the economic
ladder have often been left out or underserved by the resulting
safety net. The following case study draws on existing litera-
ture and offers primary historical evidence to show the role of
these factors in the development of the employer-based health
insurance (non) system in the United States.
Background
Rank writes, "compared to other Western industrialized
counties, the United States devotes far fewer resources to
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programs aimed at assisting the economically vulnerable"
(Rank, 2004, p. 60). Some have referred to this as American ex-
ceptionalism (Ikenberry & Skocpol, 1987). A variety of theories
attempt to understand American exceptionalism. Some trace
ideological themes prevalent throughout U.S. social welfare
history, such as a historical distaste for government and a strong
belief in personal responsibility, which have jointly resulted in
moral differentiations by society between the deserving and
the undeserving poor (Handler & Hasenfeld, 1991; Katz, 1989,
1996). Others highlight the unique role businesses have played
in the development of the safety net (Jacoby, 1997). Some
contend that the structure of modem capitalism leads to recur-
ring crises, and that the liberalization of welfare is one way that
elites pacify poor workers and stabilize the capitalist system
(Piven & Cloward, 1979, 1993). Still others examine differences
in class and labor organization in the United States relative to
other industrialized nations, suggesting that the divided char-
acter of the U.S. labor movement has kept the working class in
the United States from securing universal entitlements seen in
more generous welfare states (Esping-Andersen, 1990).
Hacker (2002) and Gottschalk (2000) contend that the true
cause of American exceptionalism is its long-term reliance on
private welfare benefits. Over the years, public and private
social welfare programs have become inextricably interwoven
so that any reform of one will seriously affect outcomes of the
other (Hacker, 2002). Pierson (2000), Skocpol (1992), and others
have developed an institutional theoretical perspective for un-
derstanding the development of the U.S. social safety net. Such
a perspective contends that current public policy debates are
limited by past policy decisions. The ambiguous divisions of
power between federal, state, and local authorities, along with
other characteristics of its governing structure, make systemic
change in the United States particularly unlikely. Institutional
theory does not preclude change, but rather boxes in the
possibilities.
In line with this institutional perspective, the U.S. social
safety net has developed slowly and incrementally over time.
Most social welfare histories stress the importance of the New
Deal, and without question this was a critical juncture. Less
appreciated, however, is the importance of the post-World War
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II era. In 1945, total government spending on social insurance
programs was only $735 million. It doubled in 1946, and by
1955 grew to eight times that size (Historical Statistics on the
United States, 2006, nominal dollars).
During the post-war era, many of the divisions within the
safety net took shape. Perhaps most important has been the
development of social insurance, which many scholars consid-
er to be reserved for "labor force members with a reasonable
history of job attachment" (Blaustein, O'Leary, & Wandner,
1997, p. 21). Throughout the history of the U.S. safety net,
however, there have always been certain classes of workers
with substantial labor force attachment who have been ex-
cluded from social insurance benefits based on characteristics
of their employment. Agricultural and domestic workers, for
example, were categorically excluded from Social Security and
Unemployment Insurance for many years (Quadagno, 1988;
Norton & Linder, 1996).
In this way, employment characteristics have acted as
mechanisms of exclusion: criteria by which certain groups of
workers have been ruled ineligible for some of the major social
insurance programs in the United States. Job characteristics as
mechanisms of exclusion play a particularly important role in
the case study offered below. As employer-based health insur-
ance incrementally came to dominate in U.S. health care, many
workers and their families were covered quite well. Others,
however, were left out, and the key mechanism of this was
labor market discrimination that marginalized women and
people of color.
The Emergence of Employer-Based Health Insurance
At the turn of the 2 0 th century, only an eclectic group of fra-
ternal organizations, employers, and private insurers offered
some form of "sickness" benefits, and most Americans had
no health coverage (Hacker, 2002). Employer-based health
insurance only became common during the post-World War II
era. Ithasbeen calledan "accidental system" (Cabel, 1999,p. 62),
and during the 1940s, few anticipated that it would become the
dominant mode of health care coverage (Gottschalk, 2000).
President Roosevelt decided not to include a health care
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program as part of the 1935 Social Security Act because of
threats from the American Medical Association (AMA). The
AMA had proven to be a virulent critic of such proposals in the
past, and Roosevelt felt that including a health care program
might jeopardize the entire bill, threatening his unemploy-
ment insurance and social security programs (Quadagno,
2005). Thus, he postponed action on health care, planning to
return to it later. The refocusing of the country on World War
II, however, meant that health care did not return to the top
of the administration's agenda again during Roosevelt's presi-
dency. In 1939, Senator Robert Wagner of New York proposed
adding health care provisions to the existing Social Security
Act. Roosevelt, however, did not back the Wagner bill, and it
was never reported out of committee (Poen, 1979).
Instead of a national health program, a number of factors
spurred the growth of employer-based health benefits during
the 1940s. Many argue that the wage freeze imposed during
World War II-which set wages at pre-war levels-led firms to
offer health benefits in an effort to compete for workers. Hacker
(2002), however, writes that the freeze "did not, as is often
claimed, single-handedly drive up coverage during the war"
(p. 218). In fact, by the end of the war (1945), still fewer than
one in four Americans were covered by private insurance. The
period of most dramatic growth started a few years after the
war, when employer coverage exploded. By 1960, two-thirds
of the population was covered by some form of private insur-
ance, with employer-based insurance making up the greatest
fraction of this.
A number of other important public policy decisions
during the postwar era created clear economic incentives
for employers to provide health benefits to their workers.
Quadagno (2005) credits the Revenue Act of 1942, which
levied an immense tax on corporate profits that rose above
pre-war levels. Importantly, the act excluded from profits em-
ployer contributions toward health insurance programs and
group pension plans, creating an incentive for companies to
shift excess profits into benefit trust funds (Gottschalk, 2000).
Once the funds were created, there existed institutional mo-
mentum to continue them. Also important was a 1943 National
War Labor Board ruling that employers' contributions toward
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health insurance for their workers would not count as wages
and were therefore tax-deductible for employers and exempt
from income and payroll taxes for workers. This provided a
long-term incentive to compensate and retain employees by of-
fering fringe benefits. These tax benefits were not extended to
individually purchased insurance policies. The ruling further
meant that labor unions could bargain for increased health and
other fringe benefits in lieu of wage increases.
While each of these policy decisions was undoubtedly im-
portant in the growth of employer-based coverage, most recent
historical accounts point to the power of influential interest
groups in U.S. health policy debates over the years (Hacker,
2002; Gottschalk, 2000). Quadagno (2005) stresses the vehe-
ment and long-term opposition to nationalized health plans by
doctors, headed by the American Medical Association (AMA),
which feared that such a system would usurp their autonomy
and power. Employers have also historically strongly opposed
nationalized health care, lobbying against such reforms each
time they were under serious consideration (Jacoby, 1997).
Interest group opposition stood in the face of postwar
public support for a more active role by government. In the
late 1940s, more than 80 percent of Americans were sup-
portive of health care reform that would reduce the costs of
care (Blendon & Benson, 2001). Thus, national health insur-
ance reform remained regularly on the public agenda follow-
ing 1943, when Senators Robert Wagner, John Dingell and
Phillip Murray introduced the Wagner-Murray-Dingell bill to
Congress (American Historical Association, n.d.). This legisla-
tion would have added a national health program to the Social
Security Act by establishing a national medical care and hos-
pitalization fund, to which employers and employees would
each contribute 1.5 percent of the first $3,000 of their yearly
wages. The self-employed could participate if they contributed
the full 3 percent themselves. The fund would have paid for
all doctors' care, including specialists, hospitalization up to 30
days, x-rays, and lab tests, but would not have covered dental
care or prescription drugs (American Historical Association,
n.d.).
The Wagner-Murray-Dingell bill was vigorously sup-
ported by organized labor, including the American Federation
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of Labor (AFL) and the Congress of Industrial Organizations
(CIO), but opposed by the National Physician's Committee,
the AMA, and other groups of organized physicians, who
denounced it as "socialized medicine" (Poen, 1979, p. 47). It
was also criticized for being too centrally administered by the
federal government, for not including funds for hospital con-
struction, and for not covering citizens who were not working
(American Historical Association, n.d.). Like its predecessors,
the bill died in committee.
On April 12, 1945, Harry Truman was sworn into office as
president after Roosevelt's sudden death. He wanted to move
quickly on a national health insurance program, which he con-
sidered the missing piece of the New Deal. Responding just
one month later, Wagner, Murray, and Dingell introduced the
second version of their bill (American Historical Association,
n.d.). It was very similar to the previous version, but the new
bill also included coverage for dental and nursing care, as well
as offering alternative administrative procedures to protect
private medical cooperatives (Poen, 1979). Despite Truman's
support, the revised bill still remained stuck in committee.
On November 19, 1945, Truman sent a special message to
Congress asking for national health care legislation. He made
five specific requests: (1) funds for hospital construction; (2)
state grants for public health services and maternal/child
health; (3) funds for medical research; (4) expansion of com-
pulsory insurance under Social Security; and (5) cash benefits
for sick and disability leave (Truman, 1945). That same month
Wagner, Murray, and Dingell re-introduced the health care
provisions of their previous plan as yet another bill (American
Historical Association, n.d.). This bill, their third attempt, in-
cluded medical insurance, home nursing, and dental care, as
well as grants to states for public health work and infant and
maternal health.
Organized labor was essential to advocacy efforts for a na-
tional health insurance bill during this period, as they grew
in size and influence. In 1940, they represented only about 17
percent of the non-farm U.S. labor force. By 1950, they rep-
resented 29 percent of all workers and 40 percent of private
sector employees. In contrast, today only 7.5 percent of private
industry workers belong to a union (Bureau of Labor Statistics,
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2008).
In February of 1944, labor leaders, a group of liberal doctors,
and Wagner, Murray, and Dingell, among others, formed a
group that would later become known as the Committee for
the Nation's Health. This advocacy entity served as a crucial
meeting place for organized labor and other allies to coordi-
nate lobbying in support of national health insurance (Poen,
1979). Many labor leaders testified in support of the Wagner-
Murray-Dingell bill that spring in hearings before the Senate
Committee on Education and Labor. In fact, analyses of the
committee transcripts find that 16 individuals representing
unions testified in front of the committee in 1946, and these
representatives were overwhelmingly in favor of the bill. In
comparison, that same year 15 individuals testified repre-
senting medical societies (although more than 50 individuals
related to the medical profession testified).
William Green, president of the AFL, argued that "though
in our opinion the need is for the immediate adoption of an
inclusive and comprehensive program, we support this pro-
posal to provide for a national health program because it rep-
resents to us a worthy step in the right direction" (National
Health Program Part 1, 1946). Solomon Barkind, research di-
rector for the Textile Workers of America, made clear that he
viewed private insurance only as a stop-gap measure and that
his union "favored the introduction of these systems pending
establishment of an adequate health insurance program"
(National Health Program Part V, 1946). James Carey, secre-
tary treasurer of the CIO, echoed this sentiment saying, "We
believe in a Federal System because under it our members and
all working people can obtain for themselves and their fami-
lies complete medical and hospital care." He further argued
that "coverage under the voluntary plans is today quite inad-
equate" (National Health Program Part 2, 1946).
Despite active support by unions and other advocates,
like its predecessors, the bill continued to be held up in com-
mittee and remained there until the Republicans seized the
Congressional majority in November of 1946. This was the
first time the GOP had controlled both Houses since 1928. The
election was widely considered a referendum on an unpopular
president, and it seriously dampened the prospects of serious
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movement of his policy agenda, including health coverage
reform.
Despite showing strong support for a government health
coverage program in 1946, other factors pushed most unions
to become bureaucratic entities focused on worker benefits
(Root, 1982; Zinn, 1999; Gottschalk, 2000). In June of 1947, the
Taft-Hartley Act (formally the Labor-Management Relations
Act) passed. This act greatly restricted the powers of orga-
nized labor. Among other provisions, it prohibited secondary
boycotts and wildcat strikes, allowed states to prohibit closed
union shops, and raised doubts about whether fringe benefits
were subject to collective bargaining. A 1948 National Labor
Relations Board ruling affirmed that fringe benefits were
subject to collective bargaining, and this judgment was codi-
fied in a Supreme Court ruling that same year. Thus, Quadagno
writes, "fringe benefits became organized labor's key strategy
for recruiting and retaining workers" (2005, p. 52). As a result,
instead of advocating for universal government social insur-
ance, the energies of most labor unions were redirected toward
aggressive advocacy of fringe benefits for members. Between
1946 and 1957 the number of workers covered by health insur-
ance plans dramatically increased from 1 million to 12 million
(Quadagno, 2005).
This change in emphasis remained a source of division
within organized labor. Reuther of the United Auto Workers
(UAW) hoped to eventually push employers to support univer-
sal government policies by substantially raising fringe benefit
costs (Gottschalk, 2000). Whatever the reason for this strategic
change, a result was that national health insurance legislation
did not receive the same kind of support from organized labor
later in the decade that it enjoyed in 1946.
In May of 1947, Truman once again sent a special message to
Congress requesting that a national health insurance program
be enacted (Social Security Online, n.d.). Later that month,
Wagner, Murray, and Dingell introduced a fourth version of
their bill, with some concessions based on earlier criticisms.
That summer, hearings were held on the latest Wagner-
Murray-Dingell bill, but once again it did not come up for a
vote (Social Security Online, n.d.). Truman further appointed
Oscar Ewing to head the Federal Security Agency (FSA) as
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a way to demonstrate continued commitment to health care
reform (Quadagno, 2005). In early 1948, Ewing established
the National Health Assembly, a group of civic, business, and
labor leaders. This body agreed that equal access to health in-
surance should be guaranteed regardless of race but did not
collectively advocate for a national health insurance program
to meet this goal (Quadagno, 2005). Simultaneously, the AMA
launched a "National Education Campaign against National
Health Insurance Proposals" (Social Security Online, n.d.).
In September of 1948, Ewing released The Nation's Health: A
Report to the President, which shed light on the vast numbers of
U.S. citizens who were uninsured and in poor health. The report
called for national health insurance. House Republicans imme-
diately moved to discredit the report and Ewing (Quadagno,
2005). They publically investigated AFL- and CIO-run lobby-
ing workshops facilitated under the auspices of the FSA in
an attempt to bolster charges that the FSA was using federal
funds to spread false information about national health insur-
ance (Quadagno, 2005).
Through all this, most Americans remained supportive of
government-led health care reform that would reduce medical
costs, even as they became less supportive of a national health
insurance plan (Poen, 1979). Truman unexpectedly won reelec-
tion in November of 1948, and the Democrats regained control
of Congress. Truman, who had campaigned on national health
insurance, quickly encouraged Congress to take action on the
issue in his third special health message in April 1949. Three
days later, Murray introduced an administration-sponsored
health bill similar to his previous bills. It is commonly referred
to as the Truman Plan. The new bill banned racial discrimina-
tion in health care but, in a concession to the South, allowed
separate but equal facilities for non-white patients (Quadagno,
2005).
This time around, crucial groups that had previously been
supportive lined up to oppose the bill, including the Roman
Catholic Church. In 1949, only four individuals representing
labor unions testified in front of the Senate Subcommittee
on Labor and Public Welfare. James Carey of the CIO
testified in favor, saying, "Unions are often accused wrongly
of being selfish and seeking their own welfare... We advocate
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a national compulsory program in part because we want ev-
eryone covered and sharing in the benefits" (National Health
Program Part 1, 1949). Nelson Cruikshank of the AFL testified
that "Senate bill 1679 presents a complete and comprehensive
program to meet the health needs of the nation, resting on the
firm foundation of the proven principle of contributory social
insurance" (National Health Program Part 1, 1949). Despite
these few examples, labor was far less active in support of
the bill in 1949, compared to earlier in the decade. With little
support and virulent opposition, the Truman Plan, like its pre-
decessors, failed to be reported out of committee.
That same year, a number of alternative health care mea-
sures were also forwarded. The first was the Hill-Aiken bill.
Partially written by the AMA, it included a government-sup-
ported plan to help pay for private insurance for those who
could not afford it. Additionally, the Taft-Smith-Donnell
bill (S.1581) was a means-tested program to provide federal
funds for medical care for the poor. Labor unions opposed
these measures because they were aimed only at the poor.
Harvey Brown, president of the International Association of
Machinists was "unalterably opposed to S.1581 because it rests
on the un-American principle of charity medicine" (National
Health Program Part 1, 1949). Carey of the CIO furthered the
case, saying "any adequate health legislation must meet the
needs of the middle-income group of Americans" (National
Health Program Part 1, 1949). Poen (1979) contends that Hill-
Aiken might have been the best chance for serious legislative
action during this period, had Truman been willing to back
it. However, Truman never endorsed it for fear of alienating
organized labor (Poen, 1979). With the failure of the Truman
Plan, the failure of these means-tested proposals, and contin-
ued growth of employer-based health insurance, the course of
health care in the United States was set for years to come.
The Context: Race and Sex Employment
Discrimination During the Postwar Era
As discussed above, private health insurance
coverage expanded rapidly during the postwar years. These
benefits, however, did not spread to all Americans-or even all
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workers-evenly. Marginalized groups were particularly un-
likely to be offered employer-based health insurance, mainly
because they were excluded from many employment oppor-
tunities. U.S. postwar labor relations were marked by race and
sex discrimination on the part of employers, unions, and con-
sumers. Blacks and other disadvantaged people of color were
excluded from many skilled jobs and relegated to menial ones.
Women were excluded from whole industries and occupations,
and married women were only able to enter the labor market
in larger numbers after institutionalized barriers such as mar-
riage bars (laws that required women to leave their jobs when
they married) were repealed. Women were also unlikely to be
union members. Thus, in a variety of ways, characteristics of
employment such as industry, occupation, unionization, and
job status acted as mechanisms of exclusion from economic
opportunity. As the country continued down the path of em-
ployer-based health benefits as described above, this further
stratified labor market and social benefit outcomes.
Blacks and Health Insurance during the Postwar Era
Because of limitations presented by available historical
data, this discussion is restricted to understanding health in-
surance access among blacks during the postwar era. Blacks
were the largest minority group in the United States during the
period, and available historical research has documented the
considerable employment discrimination they faced during the
postwar era. During the war demobilization, blacks were typi-
cally the first to be fired from wartime industries (Rosenberg,
2003). Black men consistently had a higher unemployment
rate than white men throughout the period, and those with
jobs were "concentrated in lower status, lower paying jobs"
that were less likely to offer benefits (Rosenberg, 2003, p. 142).
Some econometric studies of postwar labor market trends
have found that racial discrimination in employment receded
during the period (Alexis, 1998; Smith & Welch, 1989). Reich,
however, found that, after accounting for migration patterns
and resulting changes in the occupational distributions, the
data "suggest continuity rather than change in racial economic
inequality in the period 1950-1970" (Reich, 1980, p. 131).
Unions were complicit in employment discrimination
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during the postwar era. A 1946 survey by the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) found that roughly 30 unions at
that time had official policies discriminating against blacks
(Discrimination, 1947). The ACLU further found that few states
had laws that adequately protected blacks and other racial mi-
norities from discrimination by unions. Clyde Summers (1946)
looked systematically at admission policies among labor
unions. At least in terms of official policy, he found that indus-
trial unions fared better, as exclusionary policies were more
common in the skilled craft and railroad unions. Summers
found that among the marginalized groups he examined,
"Negroes are unquestionably discriminated against most se-
verely" (p. 91).
Discrimination in the labor movement persisted through-
out the postwar era. As of 1960, the Brotherhood of Railway
and Steamship Clerks still maintained segregated lodges and
unequal seniority rankings, and the United Brotherhood of
Carpenters and Joiners continued to enforce segregated locals.
Herbert Hill, labor secretary for the National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), gave a report
to the NAACP's membership in 1961 detailing racist practices
within organized labor. He reported that "the national labor
organization has failed to eliminate the broad pattern of racial
discrimination and segregation in many important affiliated
unions," and that most existing efforts were "piecemeal and
inadequate" (p. 109). Hill concluded that discriminatory prac-
tices took four major forms: (1) outright exclusion; (2) segre-
gated locals; (3) separate seniority lines; and (4) exclusion
from apprenticeships. He warned that the "concentration of
unskilled, low-paying jobs with a lack of employment stabil-
ity together with other income limitations... all contribute to
an explanation of why Negroes constitute a permanently de-
pressed economic group" (Hill, 1961, pp. 117-118).
Period data on health insurance coverage by race are
limited. Thomasson (2006) has analyzed a 1957 nationwide
survey administered by the National Opinion Research Center
(NORC). This survey was one of the first to collect nationally
representative data on race and insurance coverage. Survey
estimates suggest that 75 percent of whites had private health
coverage in 1957, compared to 52 percent of blacks (Thomasson,
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2006). Among the employed, the current author's analyses find
that white workers were more than 20 percentage points more
likely to have insurance than black workers, and differences
in take-up rates do not explain this gap. Nearly all the black
families who were offered group coverage chose to enroll.
Thomasson concludes that much of the gap "appears to be in
access to group insurance" (2006, p. 534).
As employer-based health insurance became the primary
mechanism for health coverage, many blacks found them-
selves excluded from coverage. The decisions by major unions
to focus on employer-based health benefits for members com-
pounded the effects of discrimination. Health outcomes were
similarly bifurcated. Thomasson (2006) reports that the "re-
duction of white infant mortality from 1947 to 1960 was twice
that of black infant mortality and was concentrated in causes
of death that tend to respond to antibiotics" (pp. 532-533).
Certainly access to employer-based health insurance was not
the only factor driving this and other differences. Medical fa-
cilities continued to be segregated. Nevertheless, health insur-
ance access undoubtedly played a role in the postwar health
disparities separating whites and blacks.
Women and Health Insurance Access during the Postwar Era
Only about 14 percent of married women worked for pay
in 1940. During the postwar era, this grew rapidly so that by
1970, that proportion was 40 percent. Many factors led to this
increased participation in the paid labor force. Some women
demanded a wider range of employment opportunities to
match rising rates of education. Macroeconomic changes
further meant the jobs available to women changed compo-
sitionally. By 1970, clerical work had become the largest oc-
cupation among women (Costa, 2000). Clerical jobs were less
dangerous than manufacturing jobs previously available.
Part-time work went from being virtually nonexistent to fairly
prominent during the 1940s and 1950s, driven by firms seeking
to attract married women. During the postwar era, firms faced
a declining supply of unmarried women because of increas-
ing college enrollment, the baby boom, and other factors. In
response, firms began to offer part-time jobs, hoping to appeal
to married women (Costa, 2000).
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Reskin writes that "sex segregation was remarkably re-
silient over the first 60 years of the twentieth century, despite
broad economic and social transformations" (1993, p. 245).
Before 1940, sex discrimination was institutionalized in the
form of marriage bars. For reasons similar to those spurring
the growth of part-time work, marriage bars were eliminated
during the 1930s and 1940s. Even as women entered into new
occupations and industries, though, they were denied oppor-
tunities for promotion (Reskin, 1993). Most female workers
continued to be in jobs that were stereotypical for women
(Rosenberg, 2003). Sex segregation by industry also meant that
women were unlikely to be union members, making up only
17 percent of union members in 1950.
Differences in paid labor market participation between the
sexes interacted with the rise of an employer-based health in-
surance system to create a paradigm in which women were
often dependent on their husbands or other family members
for coverage. As health insurance came to be treated as com-
pensation, providing it became an extension of the role of men
as breadwinners. Drawing again from the 1957 NORC survey
(Anderson, Collette, & Feldman, 1958), analyses by the author
suggest that about three-quarters of male-headed households
reported some form of health insurance in 1957 while the same
was true of just under 60 percent of female-headed families.
Race appears to have been a compounding factor among
female-headed families: only one in four black female-headed
households reported any health insurance coverage.
Discussion
The institutional theory of Pierson (2000), Skocpol (1992),
and others contends that during any time period, current
public policy debates are limited and structured by past policy
decisions. The ambiguous divisions of power between federal,
state, and local authorities, and other characteristics of its gov-
erning structure, make systemic change in the United States
particularly unlikely. Policymakers tend to modify existing
policy structures incrementally instead of pursuing major
reforms. Institutional theory helps in understanding the de-
velopment of employer-based health insurance in the U.S.
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As employer-based coverage grew rapidly during the 1940s,
it became less and less probable that a government program
would replace it.
This institutional legacy is evident in current health cov-
erage policy debates. The plans currently under serious con-
sideration would attempt to expand health coverage and limit
burgeoning medical costs through a mixed private-public
approach (Baucus, 2008; Whitehouse.gov, 2009). The Obama
Administration's proposal works mainly through exist-
ing private insurers. It includes some critical changes, such
as mandating that insurers cover pre-existing conditions. It
also would open up the current public program that covers
Congress to citizens as one option along with private options
in a new "National Health Insurance Exchange," while leaving
the current health coverage infrastructure largely intact. While
many analysts agree that a public-private approach is not the
most efficient way to reform the system, the lessons from this
article make clear why this system is more politically viable
than anything approaching a single payer plan.
Despite the current groundswell of support, the history
offered above suggests that there remains some chance no
reform will be successful. As they have in the past, many of the
country's most powerful interest groups will participate vig-
orously in the current health coverage debate to defend their
interests. Still, it is possible that Reuther's strategy of over-
loading employers with the costs of fringe benefits has finally
proven successful, half a century later. Major employers in the
U.S. finally appear willing and perhaps eager to consider and
even support serious health reform, and this may be the factor
that tips the balance.
If current efforts prove unsuccessful, this or future admin-
istrations might consider attempting to harness this new wide-
spread support among employers through a different option: a
federal employer health insurance fund. In such a plan, all U.S.
firms and the self-employed would be given the opportunity
to join a federal program and cover all their workers for a frac-
tion (perhaps one-half or two-thirds) of the average current
cost of health insurance for a company of their size. By creating
an incentive for firms to buy into a federal program instead of
requiring or mandating a change through legislation, a federal
Employer-based Health Insurance (Non) System 195
employer health insurance fund might prove more viable than
plans that either require participation from all, or plans that
allow individuals to buy in. Importantly, it requires no com-
prehensive legislation. Congressional and executive approval
to create a plan in which employers can choose to participate
may prove easier to pass than current proposals. Second, it
makes the current mandate debate unnecessary. By working
through employers, this program takes care of the social insur-
ance pool issue, minimizing concerns about adverse selection
with a heterogeneous pool of workers. Importantly, this pro-
posal secures employer funding for much of the program cost.
Such a program could simultaneously lower most employers'
costs while securing much needed revenue for the program.
Whatever plan ultimately proves successful, the most im-
portant role for social welfare advocates is to maximize cov-
erage and quality of care for vulnerable populations. Perhaps
the greatest legacy of the employer-based health insurance
(non) system-and the U.S. social safety net as a whole-is the
extent to which it was and remains based on exclusion rather
than inclusion of workers. Many workers with reasonable job
attachment have been excluded from health care coverage
because they were excluded from employment or relegated to
secondary jobs. Industry, work hours, occupation, unemploy-
ment and tenure have all kept workers from receiving social
benefits in the United States. Further, the major existing public
program ostensibly meant to serve the poor-Medicaid-is
not well targeted: Less than half of all Medicaid expenditures
are spent on the very poor (Grogan, 2008).
In other Western industrialized countries, those facing dis-
crimination in the labor market have been guaranteed health
insurance. In the United States, labor market discrimination
has been compounded by exclusions from health care coverage
and public social insurance programs. A key factor in this has
been the divisions among U.S. workers. Organized labor in the
United States has secured countless benefits for its members
and, often by extension, for all workers in the United States.
But during the post-war era, organized labor made a strategic
decision to focus on employee benefits and, at the same time,
joined employers and government in discriminating against
people of color and women. Were the working class not divided
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by race and sex, perhaps a more comprehensive result would
have been possible. Certainly the 45 million uninsured and
many more underinsured Americans is the greatest failure of
the employer-based health insurance (non) system. Rectifying
this failure through whatever policy changes are possible-be
they incremental or, less likely, comprehensive-should be the
top health policy priority of social welfare advocates.
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